
Presidential Address

RESISTING THE APARTHEID OF KNOWLEDGES: BORDERLANDS
AND BUSY INTERSECTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Jessica A. Heybach
Aurora University

My days are currently spent overseeing three practitioner-oriented doctoral programs in a School of Education and Human Performance. Our students are exclusively in-service P–20 educators, aspiring or practicing school superintendents, and higher education professionals. I have a colleague who describes our program as a working person’s EdD program—a distinction I have come to appreciate and value. This scrappy, often overworked ethos has revelatory powers not found in other educational settings. Most of the full-time faculty in the department, myself included, were hired to specialize in research methodology and play the role of general “foundational” experts—I often feel like an *everythingist*. Given that my institution is a small, mainly undergraduate-driven, tuition-dependent, private university, the blunt realities of revenue production often force programs to bend and contort themselves to remain viable, especially so in Illinois at this particular moment. Specialization is less useful because there simply are not enough tenure-track, full-time, specialists to cover all the possible combinations of ideas that students might present faculty with in an ever-wandering stream of graduate student desires and needs.

And yet, in curious ways, maybe not unlike many of you here, I’m drawn to know and understand my students—students who appear at first glance very different from myself. Teaching graduate education students, all of whom are practitioners, has notably shaped my views regarding the theory-practice divide that has resulted from being emotionally hammered by my students’ lived experiences. I’m troubled as I listen to their stories of life inside the school and the district office. I am in awe of their stamina in the face of Illinois politics and their daily race against the insanity of budgets, mandates, policies, and back room legislation. I’m stunned at the stories they share about their students, and the commitments they cherish. I have come to describe these students as a population condemned to action. They are not afforded the luxury of action deferred—they must act. My students’ demands, needs, and curiosities are mine (for better or worse)—and to be frank, nothing in my doctoral training or years of education has prepared me for this work and these felt problems. I was prepared to debate texts and ideas, letters and words on the pages of works penned by Plato, Dewey, Counts, Freire, Noddings, Greene, Eisner, Marcuse, Ayers, Foucault, De Beauvoir, Sartre, et al.; and when I tired of those, I ran to other books and got lost in Rancière and Butler, and wandered about in Pinar’s curriculum theory. More recently my teaching of research

methodology has sent me to study qualitative research only to find myself back in the thick of philosophical debate—but this time over coding, data analysis, questions as to whether the subject still exists in research, and if we can speak of a post-qualitative paradigm in a post-truth world.

And after all this, I have looked up from my piles of books only to find my students sitting across from me, near the discreetly placed tissue box, talking about *their* students and *their* schools and *their* frustrations and *their* questions. And if I commit to sitting in this chair, then I must commit to listening as well. My first response when talking with these students has always been: “have you read so and so?” Or, “you might like so and so’s text where they argue X about blabbity-blah.” I essentially become a tour guide for the library, pointing out ideas and texts that they should go off and read to assist them in understanding their experiences and day to day practices. This might have been a viable identity for me—academic as text tour guide—but, I teach a brand of doctoral students who has little interest in becoming me, thus, they are less impressed with my encyclopedic ramblings of American thought in education, and renderings of Pragmatist philosophy. Occasionally I can entice them with a quip about feminist theory and Donald Trump; but if I’m honest, I must accept that they do not aspire to become professors. Nor do they have anxieties about where they fit in on the lineage of a discipline, and only consider teaching at the university as a second career after they retire from K–12 education—something of a side gig. They giggle at my salary. They remind me that they must check with their spouses for permission to attend conferences. They scoff at instructors who do not realize they work 60+ hours a week. They consistently shy away from writing for publication, and although they may fall in love with theory, it is a short, torrid, love affair—a brief midlife crisis—and then it passes. Instead, they remain in a long term, deeply committed marriage to practice for the sake of the kids. And so, this essay grows out of a desire to better understand *their* addiction to practice and *my* addiction to theory, and why academics persistently enact this divide. Usually this conversation results in faculty retreating to the parlor to critique practitioners and their short-sighted ideas, but today, I’d rather turn the critique inward at us, the faculty, who reinforce an “apartheid of knowledges” and consider new ways we might resist this somewhat cowardly tendency toward abstraction and certainty.

Why do faculty often invest so much energy in the building of walls that fortify the theory-practice, intellectual-practitioner, divide? Witness the deep trenches dug to defend borders rather than collaborations, partnerships, and associations built to bridge such borders. The echo chamber shouting that accompanies these border debates, rooted in what I believe is a quest for legitimacy and reminiscent of “fake news” outbursts, has done little to inspire my continued participation of late. And if we put down our collective ego for just a moment and consider the others in our midst, might we behave differently as academics and scholars, mentors and intellectuals, and as

philosophers of education? Dwight Conquergood, ethnographer and performance studies scholar, has argued:

the ongoing challenge . . . is to refuse and supersede this deeply entrenched division of labor, [an] apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and making, conceptualizing and creating. The division of labor between theory and practice, abstraction and embodiment, is an arbitrary and rigged choice and, like all binarisms, it is booby-trapped.¹

It seems that the long debate regarding the proper, “legitimate,” identity of philosophy of education in regards to the theory-practice divide and whether philosophy of education should wed itself to philosophy or to education has fallen victim to the booby-trap. The booby-trap has led some to articulate a version of philosophy of education that removes itself from the problems and practices of schooling proper and the lives of our practitioner students. Antonio Gramsci reminds us, “The intellectual’s error consists in believing that one can know without understanding and even more without feeling and being impassioned . . . that is, without feeling the elementary passions of the people.”² And so, proximity to “the people” so that we might feel the “elementary passions” of them seems necessary to the work of academics if we are to be deciphered and heard by those we profess to educate.

Given Gramsci’s point, the question emerges: has the intellectual (i.e., philosopher of education) kept up with the elementary passions of the people (i.e., practitioners)? Although the intellectual has kept up with critiques of educational practice and policy, what about understanding the complexity of commitments that are exposed and enacted in everyday policy and practice? Certainly, the logic of K–12 education reforms have done far more than just creep into higher education. Close your eyes and imagine any recent assessment or accreditation meeting on your campus. And if you happen to be employed by a State supported institution, or one in financial crisis, it is easy to recognize how our philosophical beliefs about policy and practice quickly die in the face of empirical material realities (i.e., overwhelming monetary constraints). In neoliberal contexts, even the intellectual gets easily pushed into adopting models of efficiency and certainty to quite literally save one’s jobs given contemporary material facts. There is no time for action deferred. We must act. And so, in this regard, the intellectual must recognize that they have much more in common with their K–12 comrades than they may let on.

¹ Dwight Conquergood, “Performance Studies: Interventions and Radical Research,” *Drama Review* 46, no.2 (2002): 153.

² Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, eds. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 418.

Dewey reminds us of the folly that can come from action in *The Quest for Certainty*. He wrote: “Act, but at your peril. Judgment and belief regarding actions to be performed can never attain more than a precarious probability.”³ And if only a precarious probability is possible, it becomes obvious why the intellectual feels uneasy about adopting commitments to practice and action. How can intellectuals possibly maintain their status and legitimacy in such a shoddy experiment with action? Dewey also reminds us why thought, rather than action, has traditionally been seen as the means to escape the uncertainty of practical activity:

Through thought, however, it has seemed that men might escape from the perils of uncertainty. Practical activity deals with individualized and unique situations which are never exactly duplicable and about which, accordingly, no complete assurance is possible. All activity, moreover, involves change . . . Man’s distrust of himself has caused him to desire to get beyond and above himself; in pure knowledge he has thought he could attain this self-transcendence.⁴

I think Dewey is correct in his assessment that the pursuit of pure knowledge is a quest for certainty and complete assurance, and furthers a “safety first” logic that can offer an escape route from the uncertain messiness of lived experience.⁵ Theoretical argumentation made on paper based on a copious review of the written words of others is always a safer and more certain path to establishing authority and legitimacy. We, in this room, have great command of our words, our texts, our logical faculties—faculties that allow us to suspend or escape the messiness of experience and doing. The proposition of making arguments not beholden to the brute forces of reality may quicken freedom and the imagination, but if taken too far, can appear ignorant and out of touch. Dewey aptly describes:

With those to whom the process of pure thinking is congenial and who have the leisure and the aptitude to pursue their preference, the happiness attending knowing is unalloyed; it is not entangled in the risks which overt action cannot escape.⁶

Finally, if philosophers of education are to theorize the policies and practices of schools having rarely, if not ever, occupied the spaces where doing policy and

³ John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty*, in *John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925–1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, vol. 4, 1929 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 6.

⁴ Dewey, 6.

⁵ Dewey, 6.

⁶ Dewey, 6–7.

practice occur, having never tested our ideas in practice, we might in fact be better off divorcing ourselves from education entirely and head for the humanities department at the next faculty meeting. However appealing that may be, I anticipate we might tire of that positionality as well. I suspect, those of us who found our way to philosophy of education through the back door, so to speak, or landed in a class mumbling the question “what is this?” have found the border crossing that resides deep in our DNA to be at the core of why this work is so profound. Philosophy of education, as Dewey conceived it, attempts to put ideas into action to effect social change directly and indirectly, and consequently this animates our means and aims in immeasurable ways.

RECOVERING PHILOSOPHY IN THE STREETS

Sixty-five days after Mike Brown’s murder in the streets of St. Louis on August 9th of 2014, activists and community members gathered for an interfaith service as part of #FergusonOctober. During this event, Tef Poe, an outspoken activist, artist, and founder of Hands Up United spoke to the audience: “the people who want to take the time to break down racism from a philosophical level—y’all did not show up.”⁷ He describes being broken-hearted and feeling abandoned by religious and intellectual leaders in the community—at one point shouting “get up off your ass and join us.”⁸ The young Ferguson activists in the crowd and on stage reminded the audience that this moment was distinctive, implying that different more uncomfortable forms of direct action were needed to confront systemic oppression. The event included Rev. Cornell William Brooks, the then president of the NAACP, and a variety of religious figures, who yielded their time at the mic to the crowd that was chanting: “let them speak!”⁹ The crowd’s desire to raise up the voices of those who were in the streets, the young people who were witness to an open assault on civilians by a militarized police force was clear. Lest we forget, this assault replaced the use of force by dogs and fire hoses with armored tanks and gun turrets. The disconnection between young and old forms of activism, between discussions of change in theory and change in practices was palpable. Cornel West attempted to bridge the gap by bellowing into the microphone: “I didn’t come here to give a speech, I came here to go to jail.”¹⁰ For those of us in this room who have attended any direct action events in the recent past, we know the feeling well—the jarring experience of putting your physical body in action with your political beliefs. The often awkward tension and

⁷ Staff Reports, “Interfaith Gathering Calling for End to Police Violence Brings Hundreds to Arena,” *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 12, 2014, https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/faith-and-values/interfaith-gathering-calling-for-end-to-police-violence-brings-hundreds/article_fa174bab-4e69-5351-9c71-ceafce1d60b8.html.

⁸ Staff Reports, “Interfaith Gathering.”

⁹ Staff Reports, “Interfaith Gathering.”

¹⁰ Staff Reports, “Interfaith Gathering.”

contradictions of theorizing and philosophizing in motion can only be felt through embodied experiences. Ferguson activists reminded spectators of the mandate to participate in such times.

Poe, a high school dropout, went on to continue his activism in St. Louis and recently spent time at Harvard as an American Democracy Project Fellow and a Nasir Jones Hip-Hop fellow at the Hip-Hop Archives. He has since argued that “philosophical-to-frivolous arguments are distracting us from the needs and concerns of the real people at the heart of the movement.”¹¹ In a recent interview Poe describes his experience of “becoming an intellectual” and taking the time to translate his experience to the wider public. He notes, “it’s quite stressful sometimes because you don’t have the luxury of writing the think piece before you are arrested. My think piece came from being arrested. Realizing I had to find some way to really talk about this.” Poe articulates a directionality related to doing intellectual work—it must be born out of experience. Experiences that jar us into thought by interrupting our taken for granted assumptions about existence behave as a form of violence able to dismantle knowledge. Such knowledge—akin to Deborah Britzman’s notion of difficult knowledge—is emergent, unsettled, contingent, makeshift, and embodied long before it is known in language.¹² It exhausts us.

Julia Kristeva in *Black Sun* describes the initial consequences of violent, monstrous experiences on psychic identity as “a tremendous crisis of thought and speech, a crisis of representation.”¹³ But, what is at first a crisis of representation and language—how does one articulate such experiences to make others understand—moves suddenly to a crisis of signification brought on by the invisibility of the crisis that can affect the individual. The anguish and grief that consumes the activist in Ferguson, crying mothers on the nightly news, stepfathers shouting “burn this motherfucker down” in the streets should only be understood as resulting from the felt experience of disregard and invisibility.¹⁴ A “brutalized consciousness” emerges in the realization that others have contempt for not only your lived experience, but your very existence.

Poe goes on to rightfully recast the average person in Ferguson as already “intellectual”: “The people that are living in poverty, the people that are

¹¹ Bakari Kitwana, “Tef Poe on Why He’s Taking Aim at ‘White Privilege II’ with ‘Message to Macklemore,’” *ColorLines*, February 10, 2016, <https://www.colorlines.com/articles/tef-poe-why-hes-taking-aim-white-privilege-ii-message-macklemore>.

¹² Deborah Britzman, *Lost Subjects, Contested Objects* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998).

¹³ Julia Kristeva, *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 221.

¹⁴ Ray Sanchez, “Michael Brown’s Stepfather at Rally: ‘Burn this Bitch Down,’” *CNN*, December 8, 2014, <https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/25/us/michael-brown-stepfather-video/index.html>.

affected by these issues firsthand . . . the most marginalized folks in our community . . . they are already intellectuals for these ideas.”¹⁵ He explains that the difference between him and others in the community is that he now has the time and privilege to step away and commit words to paper, but that writing is not what makes the intellectual an intellectual. Rather, thinking is what makes one an intellectual. Those attempting to craft solutions to lived problems are doing the difficult work of thought, experimenting with means, and creating empirical conditions that otherwise would not exist. Pointing to the archetypes of Huey P. Newton, Bobby Seal, Elaine Brown, and Angela Davis, Poe draws attention to the tradition of having a duality of understanding that emerges from lived experience and having to theorize solutions to tragic circumstances.

I draw on the example of Ferguson for many reasons, but mainly because such realities should nag at the intellectual and wake us from our proverbial slumber. If such examples do little to move us, then, I am persuaded to agree with the critics that think there is little hope for the academy remaining an institution worth saving from extinction. For those of us who claim any attachment to philosophy *and* education, might we consider what similarities the activists in Ferguson have to the teachers and administrators within a school? How have the cries of educators gone unanswered not only by the academy at large, but specifically, by the philosopher-kings and -queens who are the heirs to a tradition that took its cues from the proverbial streets and public squares? Poe and others call us to atone for furthering a tradition that remains closed off to the very people it attempts to liberate and assist. Consequently, my aim is to wed a notion of philosophy in the streets with a vision of philosophy of education that is less ordained by traditional conceptions of disciplinary divides, text-centric thinking, ego, and impact factors.

OCCUPYING BUSY INTERSECTIONS: TOWARD HYBRIDITY IN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

By now, you may have realized that I resist Harvey Siegel’s decades old argument that “the sole obligation of professional philosophers of education . . . is that of striving to do credible *philosophy* of education” and that we have no obligation that requires “special attention to educational policy or practice” (original emphasis).¹⁶ Siegel added that philosophers of education can distance themselves from the issue of relevancy and remain autonomous from the anxieties of practitioners. Siegel’s conception of philosophy of education, followed by Rene Arcilla’s question “Why aren’t philosophers and educators

¹⁵ Deborah Blackwell, “Tef Poe and Friends ‘Break Bread’ at Ed Portal,” *The Harvard Gazette*, June 5, 2017, <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/06/tef-poe-and-friends-break-bread-at-free-harvard-ed-portal-show/>.

¹⁶ Harvey Siegel, “On the Obligations of the Professional Philosopher of Education,” *Journal of Thought* 18, no.2 (1983): 31.

speaking to each other?”¹⁷ have resulted in a cacophony of voices addressing this question (many of whom are in this room). Yet, this hyper awareness of our identity seems uninteresting to philosophers or educators proper. For example, I’ve yet to hear the Council for the Accreditation of Educator Preparation (CAEP) ask, “Where have all the philosophers of education gone?” nor does this sentiment seem to be of widespread concern to professional philosophers. However, our identity crisis does seem to be of particular concern to those of us who traverse the borders between these and other disciplines.

Perhaps, if I stood before a different type of student, or if I was employed by an institution that could resist market forces, or if I could unhear the intense longing for meaning within my students’ stories, I too might agree with a conception of philosophy of education that could forsake practice. And although such insular circumstances exist in higher education, it is less and less likely that philosophers of education will find themselves located in such spaces. Additionally, I fail to apprehend the need for a *sole* obligation of professional philosophers of education. A conception of philosophy that divorces itself from the practical concerns and “elementary passions of the people” seems inconsistent with the nature of philosophical inquiry. Dewey argues in *The Need for the Recovery of Philosophy* that,

Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men.¹⁸

Consequently, I suggest philosophers of education consider recovering the democratic impulse of philosophy as a method—a public, oral, particular, local, and timely tradition—committed to engaging citizens of any kind, learned or otherwise. A “philosophy in the streets” that is willing to forsake the certainty and comfort of our offices, podiums, and books. Instead, an embodied doing of philosophy that risks the scorn of a system that sanctions the worthiness of our work through the psychometrics of publishing (which now include the counting of tweets and likes . . . see Plum Metrics) and the often domesticating forces of our professionalized norms.¹⁹ Furthermore, what value exists in restricting lines of inquiry that could alleviate the suffering of our K–12 counterparts? Assuming the crisis of invisibility and a “brutalized consciousness” exists among practitioners, as it does among activists—those condemned to action—how are philosophers of education *not* obligated to consider these concerns within the admitted details and drudgery of building a “good” society?

¹⁷ Rene Arcilla, “Why Aren’t Philosophers and Educators Speaking to Each Other?” *Educational Theory* 52, no.1 (2002): 1.

¹⁸ John Dewey, “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” in *Creative Intelligence: Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude*, ed. John Dewey (New York: Holt, 1917), 65.

¹⁹ “PlumX Metrics,” Plum Analytics, accessed September 1, 2018, <https://plumanalytics.com/learn/about-metrics/>.

The purist turn in philosophy of education seems only motivated by an interest to attract the attention of professional philosophers: like a peacock spreading its wings to gain the other's attention. Furthermore, philosophy of education divorced from the problems of practice seems to be a gendered turn—a sexist nod on its way around the corner—by reinforcing a hierarchical relationship between theory and practice. Such a purist, gendered turn has the consequence of delegitimizing a variety of knowledges, subjugated knowledges, that do not conform to tradition or orthodoxy. In particular, the split from practice can be seen as a split from the body and therefore succumbing to an understanding that embodied knowledges are irrational, unruly, and dangerous, thus, indicative of an inferior form of knowledge.²⁰

Returning to Conquergood's critique that the choice between theory and practice is booby-trapped, he writes:

It's a Faustian bargain.²¹ If we go the one-way street of abstraction, then we cut ourselves off from the nourishing ground of participatory experience. If we go the one-way street of practice, then we drive ourselves into an isolated cul-de-sac, a practitioner's workshop or artist's colony. Our radical move is to turn, and return, insistently, to the crossroads.²²

And so it seems that a vision of philosophy of education which can resist the apartheid of knowledges and instead find its place at the crossroad, the borderland or the busy intersection, relieves the intellectual from having to pledge allegiance to one *or* the other—theory *or* practice. Yet, something about the borderland elicits unease: as if we fear that the border is not *really* permeable, or we might get caught on the other side when the tacit rules of professional norms shift. Conquergood asks: “For whom is the border a friction-free zone of entitled access, a frontier of possibility? Who travels confidently across borders, and who gets questioned, detained, interrogated, and strip-searched at the border?”²³ These powerful questions resonate given the steady history of sorting between what is and is not “philosophical enough” within philosophy of education.

Instead of furthering the quest for legitimacy and certainty that resides in whether one's work is “philosophical enough,” might the practice of border

²⁰ Michel Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in *Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interview and Other Writings, 1972–1977* by Michel Foucault, ed. C. Gordon (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1980).

²¹ A Faustian bargain refers to the legend of Faust who traded his soul to the devil in exchange for knowledge. To “strike a Faustian bargain” is to be willing to sacrifice anything to satisfy a limitless desire for knowledge or power.

²² Conquergood, “Performance Studies,” 153–154.

²³ As cited in Diana Taylor, “Dancing with Diana: A Study in Hauntology,” *The Drama Review* 43, no. 1 (1999): 59–78.

crossing, as an act, be understood as necessary to foster what Gloria Anzaldua describes as a “new *mestiza*”—a new consciousness that discloses and generates reality in ways that cannot be accomplished by those who stay within the confines of a prescribed border? Anzaldua, drawing on Mexican philosopher Jose Vasconcelos’ notion of a “cosmic race,” describes this new consciousness as:

Opposite to the theory of the pure Aryan, and to the policy of racial purity that White America practices, his theory is one of inclusivity. At the confluence of two or more genetic streams, with chromosomes constantly ‘crossing over,’ this mixture of races, rather than resulting in an inferior being, provides hybrid progeny, a mutable, more malleable species with a rich gene pool. From this racial, ideological, cultural and biological cross-pollinization, an ‘alien’ consciousness is presently in the making . . . it is a consciousness of the Borderlands.²⁴

To those I just made nervous by implying that philosophy of education should become even more “alien” than it already is, consider the rich possibilities that are available to an identity born out of hybridity. Anzaldua reminds us that borders and walls, once meant to “keep the undesirable ideas out” are responsible for “entrenched habits and patterns of behavior” that have the consequence of valorizing “analytical reasoning . . . to move toward a single goal (a Western mode).” Instead, the new *mestiza* offers a plural positionality where “nothing is thrust out, the good the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned.” The borderlands is where the phenomena of philosophy and education collide—where a new consciousness takes shape from continual creative motion that resists unitary, discreet ways of knowing. Such a consciousness is able to sustain contradictions and ambiguity, while at the same time establishing something else.²⁵

What might “something else” be for philosophers of education who position themselves within the busy intersection? Because both feet cannot maintain their position on one side of the border, a new *mestiza* positionality requires embodied acts that take place within both cultures (i.e., philosophy *and* education, the lecture hall *and* the streets). Thus, action with, not apart from, the practitioners we educate, in *their* classrooms and *their* schools, seems to be the only path forward to resist the apartheid of knowledges that creeps into our thoughts regarding the theory-practice divide. Similarly, ethnographer Renato Rosaldo writes that the “busy intersection” is a “place where a number of distinct social processes intersect. The crossroads simply provides a space

²⁴ Gloria Anzaldua, *Borderlands La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute Books, 1987), 99.

²⁵ Anzaldua, 79.

for distinct trajectories to traverse, rather than containing them in complete encapsulated form.”²⁶

Finally, I return to the idea that brought about this inquiry in the first place—the value of promiscuity in philosophy of education. Cris Mayo, in her article titled “Philosophy of Education is Bent” wrote:

At the risk of pushing the queer metaphor too far, philosophy of education is increasingly described as elite (rich over educated people who don’t have to teach children), debauched (we spend too much time thinking and don’t plan for Mondays), and perverse in our attachment to obscure and rarefied things (like those off antique store owners)—and maybe, oddly, not promiscuous enough in our attempts to make educational philosophy seem more appealing to more people. We do need to recruit, building on the latent forms of critique that go with any connection to education and make more of a spectacle of philosophy as a form of thinking and acting that is not interested in reproduction of norms.²⁷

Although the practical “elementary passions of the people” are often seen as antithetical, damaging, and limiting to philosophy of education, I submit that we might weaken the power of this assumption by engaging within the distinct social worlds of practitioners and schools. Possibly, the practice of philosophy of education can be made more recognizable to the educator if we more completely understood their commitments and anxieties. By renegotiating conceptions of the practical and the theoretical, philosophers of education can more willingly endure the hybridity of our field of study rather than closing ranks around entrenched habits of thought. If we take up the call for a new *mestiza* born out of promiscuity at the busy intersection of the borderlands, the practice of philosophy of education may open up new possibilities not yet knowable.

²⁶ Renato Rosaldo, “Introduction: Grief and the Headhunter’s Rage,” in *Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), 174.

²⁷ Cris Mayo, “Philosophy of Education is Bent,” *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 30, no. 5 (2011): 474.
