
STARTING AT HOME, AND THEN LEAVING IT

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Over the past eight years, I have annually taught the doctoral ethics course in my department, and up until recently it has been with mixed feelings that I have required Noddings' *Caring* each year.¹ I assign the text because of its enduring presence in the field, and because I see truth-value in her arguments for the relational self and the significance of the caring relation as a central part of human life and learning. Yet my discomfort came from the fact that I also find this early yet central text to be sometimes guilty of essentializing women based on their roles as mothers and care-givers. In addition, the text often seems confined to a white-middle-class perspective on care, and is sometimes politically naive. Students in the course also find parts of Noddings argument untenable. Many agree with Audrey Thompson's characterization that Noddings is simplistically promoting a color-blind ethic.² Other students find her work too hopelessly idealistic and politically naive in this era of standardization and professionalization. And a few who have been reading postmodern theory find her brand of feminism to be so essentializing of women and their experiences as to be unhelpful as a basis for moral theorizing. Indeed, when I first read *Caring* in a Master's class in 1989—before I had even heard of something called postmodernism—I was writing “NO!” and “not all women or men are like that!” in the margins of the book.

Four years ago I became a mother, and it changed the way I think about caring. While not yet prepared to completely embrace the ethic of care, my own shift in identity has made me more sympathetic to the truths that it speaks. When my baby cries at night, for example, I feel the physical longing to respond that Noddings sensuously describes in *Caring*. On the other hand, I also feel a longing to stay in my warm bed, and to elbow my partner—this baby's father—to take his turn at the task. I think parenting and caring are a lot more messy, more complex and fraught with more political conflict than Noddings seems to. Still, since I've become a parent I see more of the truth, the beauty, and the fragility in the caring relation. Motherhood, in short, changed the way I read Noddings and made me more willing to defend the caring relation and its importance in life. So when the doctoral students in my class now jump into Noddings with their critical-graduate-student personas on, intellectual knives in hand, I try to hold them off for a while. Rather than letting these students immediately begin to critique the text with theories of liberalism, critical race theory, or poststructural feminism, I urge them to consider the truths of the ethic of care. It is in this spirit that I seek to honor Noddings' seminal work—with the 20th anniversary of the original publication of *Caring* upon us in 2004—

with a critical examination of her latest work, *Starting at Home* (hereafter referenced as *SH*).³

Noddings, in this latest work, wants to show us the relationship between caring-for, caring-about, and justice. *Caring* and subsequent work on the ethic of care brought about much debate in educational philosophy regarding the relationship between justice and caring, and many critics wondered whether the ethic of care would serve to promote or inhibit broader moral aims such as justice and equality in schooling.⁴ In *Starting at Home*, Noddings confesses that she too quickly rejected the *caring-about* relation and responsibility in *Caring*.⁵ Noddings wants to again start in the home with the nurturing of infants and children as the first important caring encounters, but also explores the role caring can have beyond the home, in public institutions and policy: “I also want to emphasize the central importance of improving life in everyday homes and the possible role social policy might play in this improvement” (*SH*, 7).

Starting at Home is a text designed to re-examine the author’s ethic of care and explore its public dimensions—not only in schooling but in public policy more generally. In this text, she executes a courageous move—she uses a construction of “the best homes” in order to make the claim that such an ideal has a universal connotation. “The best homes everywhere maintain relations of care and trust, do something to control encounters, provide protection, promote growth, and shape their members in the direction of acceptability” (*SH*, 123). This move is not courageous because it is innovative. As Noddings’ acknowledges, “feminists and romantics in the nineteenth century often wrote about the redemptive qualities of good mothering and the salutary effects of these qualities exercised in the public arena” (*Ibid.*). It is bold, however, because in contemporary educational philosophizing, it is rare to make claims that can be considered universal. The “best homes” definition is central to her latest text, and makes the bold move of normatively discussing the “private,” domestic realm in the Western context of an historic split between public and private worlds.

Home, as a signifier, is never at rest in U.S. culture, but in a time of war its usage and meanings are especially pregnant. The idea of the home has a patriotic and comforting feel. Home stands as a symbol of America itself, and the national community of nation.⁶ In this essay, I will argue that Noddings’ evocation of home, with all the complex relations, desires, and interpretations given to this signifier, is an educationally limiting and politically dangerous move. The primacy of the role of home in the growth and development of human beings cannot be argued, and in that sense, *Starting at Home* may be aptly named. But without examining the importance of leaving home (both figuratively and literally) at developmentally appropriate times and ages, Noddings’ arguments for starting at home remain imbalanced, in danger of becoming the fodder for

various constricted, provincial visions of schooling that limit the possibilities of broader educational horizons for young people.

Home is the symbolic space of nurturance but it is not without political meanings, and Noddings' message is ripe with yearnings of belonging and community that can feed an insular world view.⁷ The signifier of *home*, in this political moment of global politics, cannot be used in a way that removes it from meanings of nationalism, paternalism, and parochialism. Home stands in for the nation as a romantic ideal of interdependence and salvation, and easily intertwines with nationalist rhetoric in war discourse—the Office of Homeland Security involves this most logical of rhetorical moves. Noddings wishes to evoke none of this nationalism, yet finds useful all of the meanings of close relation and connected lives. I would argue that most Americans cannot use the term *home* without feeding strong sentiments of nationalism. Philosophers like Noddings using *home* as a primary site for an ethic of relation run the risk of evoking nationalism and even isolationism where they are not wanted. The signifier of home moves us farther, not closer, to a more reflective, global perspective on ourselves and the world. In this paper, I will argue that home is a signifier that is probably best left there by philosophers of relational ethics.

THE ARGUMENT FOR STARTING AT HOME

Noddings' claim is that we can extend the attitude of caring that is characteristic of the best homes into the larger social domain, where human needs currently go ignored through the inflexible bureaucratic processes that are (at least theoretically) in place to ensure justice. In *Starting at Home*, Noddings extends previous arguments⁸ that social justice is impossible without responding positively to human needs—needs for relation, for homes, for meaningful education. Her reasoning in defense of this claim revolves around the universality and centrality of home as a place of fundamental encounters leading to growth, relations, and self. Her argument rests on the logic that if and when these fundamental encounters are missing or neglected, principles of liberty and justice are impossible to achieve for individuals or society as a whole.

Home, in Noddings' argument, is meant to evoke several ideas, the first being attentive love. In the best homes, there is at least one person present who does the work of attentive love and protection from unnecessary pain. Noddings states that the modifier “best,” refers to the ideal generated by care theory (and she sometimes uses the descriptor instrumentally) to indicate that “some homes are best for the development of characteristics and practices that are facilitative in liberal democracies” (*SH*, 123).

Home is also the place in which we learn to value caring, first through being cared for and later through caring for others, including plants, objects, and ideas. Home is a special place not merely for what it contains, but for what

it does not contain. The best homes, she delineates, control environments in order to provide protection, control encounters, and shape members toward acceptability. I can see the truth-value in this characterization. I do not let my four year-old child run in the street; I try to ensure that she eats healthy foods; I do not let her watch Steven Siegal movies; I try to help her learn about how to treat others with respect. Noddings argues that caring, especially as exemplified in the home (and as it should be practiced in social policy) is based on needs: the most basic needs of preservation and growth (eating, sleeping, clothing) and those needs that fall into categories of acceptability. My experience as a parent helps me to see the ways in which Noddings is right, or at least accurate in the ways in which she describes and provides good rationalization for the norms of child rearing in U.S. middle class white society, and arguably in many other cultural groups as well. Her definition of best homes seems to be one that could accommodate a range of cultural norms and perspectives on parenting and family life.

But of course, Noddings' focus on starting at home in our thinking about social policy and education is both extremely sensible and extremely controversial. Her sustained focus on this frequently ignored thesis in educational theory marks her genuine, lasting contribution to the field of education. In this latest work, Noddings again reminds us of the "great importance of the education that goes on in homes," adding that one of the few things educational researchers agree upon is "that there is no single factor more important in a child's success than the home" (*SH*, 289). Given this truth, she provides extensive arguments for shaping social policy so as to 1) ensure that every child lives in a home that has at least adequate material resources and attentive love, and 2) include the study of and preparation for home life in the formal school curriculum (*Ibid.*). Ensuring a good home for every child is a task that directly confronts the notions of individual autonomy; shifting the curriculum away from testing and cultural literacy directly challenges the common-sense notions of what an education is for in contemporary U.S. culture.

In taking on liberal autonomy, Noddings is consistent and forceful. One of the central critiques that feminist and other philosophers have raised against liberal ideals of justice is the reliance on autonomy as central foundational principle of fairness. Noddings states that caring-for and caring-about others will require that we abandon ideas of liberal autonomy, and she openly acknowledges the risks of paternalism and coercion that accompany the use of the care ethic in public institutions and policies. As she states, "Giving adequate attention to the identification and satisfaction of needs raises the risk of paternalism" (*SH*, 59). She concludes, however, that this is a risk worth taking, because there are times when we simply "cannot find a needs-based solution that is free of problems more worrisome than those we had set out to solve." Noddings criticizes liberal theorists for assuming that adult lives are the rational

results of autonomously-designed life-plans, and argues that adequate social policy “has to consider how best to guide encounters” (*SH*, 79). This, she concedes, opens the door to coercion, but sometimes coercion is justified. If someone is homeless, addicted to drugs, or a compulsive gambler, we still rely on the liberal model of autonomous, freely-choosing individual to guide our social policy towards those citizens. In her chapters on social policy that conclude the book, she unapologetically addresses the limited but necessary ways in which social policy and institutions must guide, shape, and sometimes coerce (though as a last resort). “Coercion is used too freely—unjustifiably, I will argue—with one group (the young), and it is not used with another even when the need is demonstrably clear” (*SH*, 80). Social policies that fail to be coercive when required, as in the situation of housing mentally ill people who repeatedly refuse housing or medication, fail to meet basic human needs and therefore fail as social policies. Meeting human needs as opposed to (simply) respecting human rights is the shift that she wants to make in the thinking that drives U.S. public institutions and social policy.

Noddings believes that if we do not educate for a firm sense of home and place, guided by an ethic of relation and encounters with others, we fail to educate moral human beings. Education encountered in the best homes provides not simply physical spaces where we can exist, but objects and spatial arrangements inside the house that give our childhoods meaning. Home is also meant to encompass the local and regional, and their respective histories, stories, cultures, smells, sights, sounds, and memories. Noddings richly describes how homes and local spaces form the life-worlds of children, representing relatively safe contexts for living, dreaming, learning, and encountering others. Echoing some communitarian themes, she makes the argument that the best educative experiences make use of the importance of home and local spaces.

An ethic so dependent on the idea of home necessarily brings about questions of parochialism, or the problem of conceiving humanity and our responsibilities towards others in an overly narrow scope. *Starting at Home* is both an extension and defense of an ethic of care, and in the text Noddings addresses the objection that the ethic is “prone to parochialism” (*SH*, 47). The problem of parochialism has been a consistent source of conflict between liberal justice theorists and care ethicists, since the caring relation’s resistance to strict principles, rule codification, or adjudicable procedures makes liberals uneasy that those in positions of power may harm while attempting to care. The caring curriculum also resists learners digesting knowledge that ostensibly prepares all to succeed equally in the U.S. or the global economy, since such an education requires that these students transcend home and place rather than dwell and learn in those familiar spaces. If there is a problem with parochialism in all this, Noddings sees the fault lying with human nature, not in her ethic. She claims that it is people who are parochial, not the caring relation in itself; the ethic of

care recognizes this fact without forgiving the evil that may come out of parochialism. She quotes a (now timely) passage from George Orwell's war-time reflections that "the man who is flying overhead trying to kill him with bombs is likely a kindhearted law-abiding person who would never dream of committing murder in private life." Yet in killing unknown hundreds or thousands, he will be absolved of evil, because he is serving his country. Noddings calls this "evil" and a tragedy, stating that we must work hard for a world in which otherwise good women and men do not commit legal murder. An ethic of care does not seek to forgive these kinds of tragedies, but it does locate their roots in human nature itself. "An ethic of care does not justify standing with one's own; it recognizes that most of us will do this, and it seeks to promote conditions under which this basic psychological orientation will not be called forth to the detriment of others" (*SH*, 49).

Let's agree with Noddings for a moment, and say that there is something natural, or at least "deep down" in terms of our identity structures, about "standing with one's own." Certainly many Americans who had a visceral and emotional response to the 9/11/01 events might agree that there is something to this idea. Even if, as Benedict Anderson so cogently argues, nationalism is the product of an imagined political community, it produces a powerful and for many, a foundational identity.⁹ Noddings claim, that "standing with one's own" is a fundamental aspect of many human lives, recognizes the strength of home-ties. The truth-value of this claim is what makes *Starting at Home* worth a careful read. The power and the strength of home and its relations are indeed a crucial source for understanding and shaping child development, and a society that fails to pay attention to this crucial fact in its social institutions is not sowing the seeds of its own healthy future.

What becomes troubling is how Noddings moves from the idea that people are naturally parochial to an argument for curriculum and schooling that may likely fortify and justify such parochialism. Noddings constructs home as a safe haven of relations and roots, with the growth of the child lodged within this setting. Yet what if a child's education is only just beginning in this setting, and comes to fruition only in settings, texts, and curricula whose focus lies far beyond the home and its parameters? Noddings' claim that we must "start at home" is true enough, regardless of whether or not parochialism is "natural" or socially constructed, but without a curriculum that helps older children and young adults to leave home, students may wind up being limited in their development and parochial in their world-view.

HOMES, WANDERING, BRIDGES

In part two of *Starting at Home*, Noddings writes artful prose describing the way that bodies, homes, and objects shape the self as relational. Encounters with places, and especially home-places of childhood, shape us. Noddings also

describes the home as both a physical and a psychic place that powerfully shapes the kinds of encounters we have and the meanings we make of them. It is in homes that we first learn (or fail to learn, as she points out) to care through encounters with bodies, place, ideas, and objects. It is in real, local places and spaces that we make meaning, she argues, and it is in these more local places that educational programs should be grounded. Education for appreciation of place, such as that seen in the *Foxfire* series, will not miseducate towards provincialism. It will not result in place-bound citizens, ignorant of the world—it will result in place-grounded citizens who develop through these local encounters a meaningful sense of who they are as human beings.

As compelling as all this sounds—and for me, it is truly compelling in so many ways—the protections that Noddings offers her reader against provincialism are based on a humanist faith and a promise, at best.¹⁰ Despite claiming that “a child who is well sheltered, one who has a healthy home, can wander forth and dwell in the world” (*SH*, 150), her text never fully explores the relationship between home and wandering. In the section, “Wandering Forth,” which falls at the end of the “Places, Homes, and Objects” chapter, I had hoped to read about the importance of encounters with Others, the Other in oneself as well as those that lie within and outside of the place-boundaries of our childhoods. Noddings takes a much more limited and metaphorical tact here, however. She discusses the importance of welcoming in visitors to our homes so that children might gain appreciation for “the ways of strangers” (*SH*, 172). She further describes “intermediate places that prepare us for life in a larger world,” such as a garden (*SH*, 173). Any long-time reader of Noddings work will be aware of her passion for gardening and the importance she places not only on relations with other humans but relations with non-human beings as well as plants and the earth. For Noddings, gardens are the bridges between built places and nature, and yield bodily and spiritual satisfaction. Gardens also build connections with relatives and neighbors through conversation, shared experience, and the sharing of produce. It is on such bridges that Noddings hopes we will wander forth from home, carrying our habits of cultivation and response towards larger and larger concentric circles of persons. In the “Wandering Forth” section of this chapter, she offers no further examples, besides gardening, for bridging home and the world. Given our current position in global politics, this seemed an important omission to me, for it leaves Noddings’ vision far too susceptible to the parochial and paternalistic dangers that lurk in her ethic of care.

Noddings rightly claims that bridges must be constructed between the home and world, and the function of such a bridge would be to help children and young adults safely span unknown waters, persons, and settings. But she gives little space or breath to what these bridges are about, what they are made of, and to where they lead. The garden, or any sustained, active relationship with the earth or its natural environment, seems a likely connection between

home and a close circle of friends and family members, appropriate for younger children with land to till and parents with inclinations to help them till it. But the garden-as-bridge example is inadequate for older children and the more serious challenges of balancing the comforts of home with the significance of leaving it. Noddings does not really push on the importance of “wandering forth” as comparable to the significance of home-as-domesticity and the known. It seems to me that only in developing the importance of “wandering forth” will an education that starts at home really ever be truly complete or adequate for children growing up in this world.

By “this world,” I do not mean the “global economy” but rather “the world,” or the earth and its living inhabitants. Noddings describes current reform movements as being primarily focused on “establishing curricula, school structures, and pedagogies that ignore place and try to design education for one great world economy” (*SH*, 155). I agree with Noddings’ assessment of current educational “reform,” designed with instrumental, economic aims rather than humanistic ones in mind. Where I disagree with Noddings is how the idea of humanity itself seems to begin and end primarily in a local context. For younger children, this context affords safety, recognition, familiarity, and love. For older children, however, this context can lead towards the parochial and chauvinistic perspectives that our national media help feed.

Constructing bridges for older children and teens must help them negotiate the unknown worlds that lie beyond the comforts of home, and these educational journeys may very well take them to places that enable them to see home with different, new eyes. Orwell’s soldier, dropping bombs on unknown people, could have learned about some of those people and their ways of living in a classroom where nationalistic aims and xenophobia were not shutting out inquiry into “foreign” people and places. Curriculum that enables students to wander forth from home is a curriculum that is rich in cultural, national, global, and environmental diversity. It is controversial curriculum that introduces students to ideas and ways of being that are sometimes simply strange and at other times practically hostile to the ways of one’s home. Further, bridges that allow teens to wander forth might directly challenge the primacy and ties of home identity. While examining one’s relationship to a distant land or a distant people’s plight, the home is set in a wider context. Sometimes those contextual understandings can inspire feelings of pride and patriotism, as the study of the heroism of World War II soldiers on the beaches of Normandy might. Other understandings will reveal the nation in a more troubling context. A high school student studying global warming should figuratively wander from home to examine the ways in which energy consumption at home contributes to the quality of life around the globe.

Noddings' brief, incomplete discussion of wandering forth, and its importance to the completion of the educational experience that starts at home, is all the more troublesome given our current political circumstances. Noddings rightly argues that we must "reconstruct our institutions so as to reduce opportunities to do harm and increase the possibilities of positive human response" in places like schools, welfare offices, and social service agencies. Without these reconstructed institutions, we are left in the condition of homesickness—"a sickness of the soul induced by a failure to care at home" (*SH*, 41). Noddings wishes to cure this illness. But she ignores another kind of homesickness, one that complicates her ethic's tendencies towards parochialism and paternalism. During the nationalist fervor of the past several years, we have seen a kind of homesickness that lurks within communities, national and otherwise. Many Americans show symptoms, which include some of the ugliest forms of parochialism, paternalism, and coercion imaginable. A belief in the romance and righteousness of "home" can justify many governmental actions, including a war and the suspension of international laws that go against those beliefs.

We as United States citizens have not done enough "wandering forth" to attain a more self-reflexive view of ourselves and our presence as a global power. This is not a wandering that requires lots of money for physical travel, although that is certainly one important way a person might be educated out of homesickness. If you take a look at most middle and high school curriculum in the public schools, you will find a dearth of international perspectives and issues.¹¹ Where you *can* sometimes find such perspectives and encounters are in some of the elite tracks and programs in America's best schools, schools with powerful parents and curriculum specialists and budgets that can afford an International Baccalaureate program, or strong foreign language programs that aim to produce fluency, or rich literature programs in which students can wander forth from home in the stories of diverse others. Hill defines international education as concerned with the acquisition of knowledge about "social justice and equity; interdependence; sustainable development; cultural diversity; peace and conflict; population concerns; languages." The attitudes to be developed in students include "commitment to social justice and equity on a world scale; empathy for feelings, needs and lives of others in different countries; respect for cultural diversity within and without one's geographical location; a belief that people can make a difference; a concern for environment on a global scale" (*Ibid.*, 27).¹² But offerings which emphasize such knowledge and values are not standard fare in most schools.¹³ In addition, the nationalist spin taken by many news organizations in the print and television media will not supplement the mediocre opportunities to "wander forth" in public schools.

The journey from kindergarten to high school graduation and beyond must both start at home and eventually leave home. Leaving home, writes Martusewicz, is at the heart of becoming educated.¹⁴ In her work on a poststructuralist approach to education and ethics, Martusewicz argues that to become different from whom we have been, we must leave the familiar and encounter the disruptive, creative world of difference. But this leaving is not an abandonment of attachment itself. “Detachment is at the heart of education and thus of our ability to think of a better world. We leave home as we search for different relations and ways of being on the earth.”¹⁵ Detachment is provoked by “flashes from unpredictable sources” and is “necessarily painful,” but is not designed to push the student back onto an individualist sense of anomie or atomism.¹⁶ It is to help the student reframe (thought not necessarily radically transform) her understanding of self, schools, and society within an enlarged view of her context, interdependencies, and possible obligations. Detachment and reframing are useful metaphors for educational possibilities in secondary schools and colleges, where many students are beginning to craft an identity through an educational journey full of encounters with difference. Such an educational journey can start at home, but it must also leave the comforts of home, too. Yet this leaving is not something done alone, as a cowboy traveler on a dangerous journey—it is a journey traveled with others, often including teachers, who best serve students when they are in tune with the demands this trip.¹⁷

It is perhaps just plain unlucky that the metaphor of home becomes re-infused with a nationalistic fervor in the same cultural moment when Noddings releases yet another important book using the same metaphor. Noddings plainly does not wish to evoke the parochialism, paternalism, and coercion that she realizes comes with the territory of home. But for all this recognition, I do not find that the care theory as extended in *Starting at Home* truly addresses the importance of *both* reveling in the home and in leaving it. Whether we leave it for a weekend or a year or a lifetime, whether we leave it only in our minds or with our bodies too, domestic and local spaces hold as much or more meaning when we leave them and return to them as they do when they entirely encompass our field of vision. They hold value for many of us only *after* we leave them for a time, as we use our agency as adults to re-shape meanings of home to our ever-changing needs and desires. The idea of starting at home makes sense, and Noddings argues elegantly for this long-ignored point, but I do not think home is the ultimate destination. As Kerouac wanted, we should go on the road¹⁸ — with our imaginations and maybe with our bodies — in order to become educated.

NOTES

1. Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

2. Audrey Thompson, "Not the Color Purple: Black Feminist Lessons for Educational Caring," *Harvard Educational Review* 68, no. 4 (1999): 522-554.
 3. Nel Noddings, *Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). All future references to this text will be within the manuscript.
 4. See, for example, Michael A. Katz, Nel Noddings, and Kenneth S. Strike (eds.), *Justice and Caring: The Search for Common Ground in Education* (New York, Teachers College Press, 1999).
 5. In *Caring*, Noddings rejects the idea of a universal ethic of care for everyone, "on the grounds that it is impossible to actualize and leads us to substitute abstract problem solving and mere talk for genuine caring." She allows that it is possible to "care about" everyone in the sense of maintaining "an internal state of readiness to try to care for whoever crosses our path," but this state is different from caring-for, the primary focus of the text (1984, 18).
 6. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Editions, 1983).
 7. Lauren Berlant, *The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).
 8. See, for example, "Care, Justice and Equity," her essay in *Justice and Caring: The Search for Common Ground in Education*.
 9. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
 10. I too have argued for the importance of community in education and schooling. See, for example, *Making Meaning of Community in an American High School: A Feminist-Pragmatist Critique of the Liberal-Communitarian Debate* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2000) and "Reclaiming Community," *Educational Theory*, 2 (Spring 1999), 143-159.
 11. See Ted Sanders and Vivien Stewart, "International Knowledge: Let's Close the Gap," *Education Week on the Web* (May 28, 2003). Available from <http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=38Sanders.h22&keywords=poverty%20and%20achievement>; Internet, accessed 19 January 2004.
 12. Ian Hill, "The History of International Education: An International Baccalaureate Perspective," in *International Education in Practice: Dimensions for National and International Schools*, eds. M. Hayden, J. Thompson, & G. Walker, (Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, 2002), 26-27.
 13. Nor should they necessarily be, according to conservative critiques of what one author calls the "global education ideology" that education school
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professors allegedly teach to prospective teachers. See Jonathan Burack, “The Student, the World, and the Global Education Ideology,” in *Where Did Social Studies Go Wrong?*, eds. James Leming, Lucien Ellington, and Kathleen Porter (Thomas Fordham Foundation, August 2003). Available from <http://www.edexcellence.net/foundation/publication/publication.cfm?id=317#907>; Internet, Accessed 26 February 2004.

14. Rebecca A. Martusewicz, *Seeking Passage: Post-Structuralism, Pedagogy, Ethics* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2001).

15. Ibid., 34.

16. Ibid., 37.

17. I address the notion of student autonomy and the importance of detachment as an element of learning in post-secondary education in “Confronting the paradox of autonomy in a social foundations classroom,” in *Teaching Context: A Primer for the Social Foundations of Education Classroom*, ed. Dan Butin (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, forthcoming).

18. Jack Kerouac, *On the Road* (New York: Viking Press, 1957).
