
Editorial Introduction

THINKING ABOUT CHANGING AND CHANGING OUR THINKING

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Things do change.¹ In the spring of 1990 I earned the Master of Divinity degree at Grace Theological Seminary, a fundamentalist Christian school in Winona Lake, Indiana. I also began working on my thesis for the Master of Theology program that I completed the following year. At the time, I was quite active as a preacher. “Have sermon, will travel” was my motto, as I preached in dozens of churches in Ohio, Kentucky and Indiana. From 1987 to 1989, I even spent three summers in England, giving evangelistic sermons and doing missionary work with youth groups. Several people in England enjoyed my sermons and requested that I send them tapes of my talks. Since I also sent sermon tapes to my grandmother in Nebraska, I used to joke that I had an international tape ministry!

As I neared the end of my seminary program, however, my few attempts at landing a pastoral position were not successful. Perhaps my fear of committing to a full-time job made me tentative in my search for a position, and perhaps the fact that I was still single presented a “red flag” to those churches that otherwise might have enlisted my services. In any event, I was almost thirty years old and still didn’t know what I wanted to do when I grew up. Thus, during that summer break, while I was visiting my parents in Columbus, I decided on a lark to visit The Ohio State University campus and inquire about doctoral programs in foundations of education. The foundations program was not totally unknown to me. I earned my undergraduate degree from Ohio State in Education, and took both the Philosophy of Education and Social Criticism in American Education classes. Graduate teaching associates taught both classes, and the latter was taught by one of Bernie Mehl’s grad students.² I would often sit in on Mehl’s lectures, and found them fascinating.³

So, I went into Aarps Hall and asked the secretary for information on doctoral programs. She made a phone call and told me that a Dr. Pratte was available and would be glad to talk to me. She then directed me to Ramseyer Hall. I entered the majestic building and had my first encounter with Dick Pratte. Sitting at a long conference table, I shared with him my situation and my interest in doing doctoral study. I mentioned that my master’s thesis was on the concept of *illumination*.⁴ He asked me, in a tongue in cheek manner (as I now realize), if it was an empirical study. For whatever reason, he seemed to take a liking to me. Maybe I amused him. In response to whether my evangelical orientation would pose a problem, Pratte said it wouldn’t, but he sternly warned me that if I engaged in any proselytizing I would be fired on the spot. After returning to Indiana and submitting the requisite paperwork, I received a call from Pratte informing me

that I had been accepted to the doctoral program in philosophy of education and that I would start classes in the fall of 1991.

MY FIRST OVPES CONFERENCE

I attended my first OVPES conference in November of 1991. It was held at the Omni Netherlands Hotel in Cincinnati, Ohio. I drove to the conference with my fellow grad student Trevor Davison. Trevor was from England, and was two years ahead of me in the program. It was the first academic conference I had ever attended. Several incidents and images from the conference remain in my memory. Dick Pratte was not able to attend. He told me it was the first conference he had missed in over twenty years. Jerry Reagan would periodically stick his head into the conference rooms, holding an ashtray in one hand while waving with the other hand in which he brandished a Salem 100 cigarette. I never did see him actually attend a session. Rich Angelo caught my attention because he had the most impressive—yes, even beautiful—head of hair. Also, the way he would snap his fingers when he made a point was very cool. In one of the sessions, Barb Stengel commented on her sadness in the wake of Ervin “Magic” Johnson’s recent disclosure that he was HIV positive. I recall seeing Clint Collins and thinking that he had a rather Abe Lincoln-esque quality to him. Maybe it was his beard, or his aquiline nose, but most likely it was because he had his “paper” written on a piece of slate. No, not really. It was, however, hand-written.

After the sessions, I attended the reception and sat with my fellow Ohio State grad students: Trevor, Ron Ferguson, and Mark McKenzie. Another of our crew, Christine McCarthy, was the only one to give a presentation. Her paper was a comparison of Marx and Mill’s views on *rights*. We discussed the sessions and I drank orange juice. I expressed my utter ignorance of the various topics that were presented. “What is postmodernism and post-structuralism, and who is Carol Gilligan and this Foucault guy everyone is talking about?” To use a Prattian phrase, I “didn’t know shit.” The prospect of raising a question or making a comment at the conference filled me with dread. The possibility of someday presenting a paper seemed beyond the pale.

TEN YEARS LATER

I was given the opportunity to serve as the Program Chair for the 2001 OVPES conference. In the ten years since my first conference, many things had changed. Dick Pratte retired after my first year at OSU, and moved to North Carolina. Fortunately for me, he graciously agreed to help guide the writing of my dissertation, served on my committee, and flew to Columbus for the defense of my dissertation. For that, I will be forever grateful. I heard that Jerry Reagan retired in 2001. I took up smoking in 1997. Of course, due to smoking regulations,

I am not able to smoke in the conference rooms as my former advisor Jerry Reagan once did. Rich Angelo's hair is—how shall I say this—a little shorter and a little grayer, but it still looks great. Magic Johnson has not played professional basketball for several years, but I am happy to note that he appears to remain healthy. Clint Collins continued to bring hand-written papers until the 2000 conference, when Deron Boyles noticed and remarked that Clint actually had a typed paper for the symposium we were presenting.⁵

Of my fellow grad students, I am the only one currently active in OVPES. Christine McCarthy is at the University of Iowa, and is perhaps the most successful scholar of the lot. Trevor Davison's dissertation was titled "Marx, Freedom and Education." He found a professorial position in Australia. The last I heard from Trevor, he had quit academia and was working as a training and development consultant for the gold and copper mines in Indonesia. Ron Ferguson, Mark McKenzie and I were reunited in 1997, when we served as "contract" assistant professors at Ball State.⁶ While there, we had the privilege of getting to know Richard Brosio. I would describe Richard as a cross between Woody Allen and Marx (both Karl and Groucho). He was one of the wittiest and most memorable characters in the history of OVPES, and is currently retired and living near Milwaukee.

As for me: not only did I get up the nerve to make comments at subsequent OVPES conferences, I eventually gave paper presentations, chaired sessions, served on a program committee and on the *PSIE* editorial review committee. If this article makes it to print, it will be the first time I have been published in the Society's journal.

ON THE 2001 CONFERENCE

There are three characteristics of the essays in this collection that I feel mark significant change from the presentations given at the 1991 OVPES conference. First, is the prevalence of Plato and Socrates. While this may be attributable to the conference theme, it might also mark a revival of interest in the Platonic figure of Socrates. Foucault—so prominent in the earlier conference—is only referred to once, in passing. Second, is the attention given to the dominant educational issue of our time: namely, standards, testing, and accountability, the reigning trinity of school reform. These matters were given scant attention in 1991, and I would venture to guess that they might be given little attention ten years from now. Those aligned against these practices (as are most of the contributors to this journal) might be successful in effecting their modification or eradication: in which case, such discussion will be moot. Or, these "reform" measures might become so engrained in the institutional structure of schooling that they will be taken for granted. In other words, the pressing educational issues *de jour* will come and go (and sometimes return), and this

issue of *PSIE* will serve as a timepiece (which is not unimportant), marking the particular preoccupations of this group, at this place and time. The third distinguishing characteristic of this conference is its proximity to the events of September 11th.

The conference was held on September 28th and 29th. Due to fallout from the attacks, several of the scheduled presenters were not able to attend. For those who did attend—especially those who flew—the events of 9-11 and air travel in the aftermath pervaded our conversations. Since paper proposals were submitted months before the conference, the scope and topics of the presentations were fairly well established, leaving little opportunity to incorporate reference to 9-11. The exception is Nick Burbules’ *Phil Smith Lecture*. He notes in his introduction the ubiquity—and contrived nature—of articles on *change* that were prompted by the advent of the new Millennium. “If a new era began,” Burbules announces, “it was not on January 1, but on September 11.” He then considers several possible societal responses to the attacks: each of which he finds lacking. “What has happened to our society’s understanding of ‘education,’” Burbules asks, “that has so impoverished our ability to respond intelligently and imaginatively to the changed circumstances of this new era?” He blames the “particularly shallow and ill-conceived” conceptions of “an educated person” that dominate current approaches to schooling: vocationalism and careerism, educational attainment defined by test performance, and E.D. Hirsch’s “cultural literacy.” Burbules then guides us on an exploration of the history of educational ideas. Some ideas he embraces and others he discards, in an attempt to “sketch the broad outlines of a conception of an educated person.” Such a person, Burbules suggests, would be better equipped to “cope with a world that is complex, diverse, and rapidly changing.”

In his presidential address, Joseph Watras traces several Twentieth Century attempts to reform educational policy and practice. Specifically, Watras examines two phrases (or slogans) that guided these reform efforts: During the first half of the century, educational policy makers aimed to meet students’ *needs*, and in the latter half they sought to affirm students and parents’ *rights*. The problem with these attempts, according to Watras, was that the uncritical reliance on these slogans “could distract the reformers from thinking about the complexities involved in any democratic society or a democratic way of thinking.” Watras goes on to argue that philosophy of education courses should prepare prospective teachers to think clearly and critically about the goals and aims of schooling. This, he thinks, would lead to a more acute understanding of the language and potential effects of proposed policy, alert prospective teachers to the limitations and inadequacies of these proposals, and presumably enable teachers to craft educational practices that are consistent with their own informed conception of the purposes of schooling.

While I don't want to steal his thunder, I would like to elaborate on some of the issues that are suggested in Deron Boyles' thought-provoking response to Watras' address. To be sure, the language of slogans does characteristically function to obfuscate the complexities of a given situation. Moreover, as Israel Scheffler explained in his classic treatment of the subject, slogans are used *because* they simplify the complex, obscure obstacles to their implementation, compel agreement, and forge consensus. Therefore, Scheffler recommends a "dual analysis" for the critical appraisal of slogans. First, a slogan's literal purport is examined. Typically, the language of slogans is illogical or vacuous. This necessitates the independent analysis of the practical purport of the slogan. Slogans originate from a "parent doctrine" and serve as a symbolic rallying cry to achieve the ends envisioned in the doctrine. The practical analysis, then, would involve an assessment of the practical effects and likely consequences of the implementation of the policies and practices favored by the sloganeers.⁷

Given the theme of Watras' address, it is surprising that he doesn't avail himself to the philosophical literature on the critical analysis of slogans, nor does he give serious consideration to the numerous philosophical analyses of the language of *needs* and *rights*.⁸ Boyles hints at this critical lacuna (ambiguity intended) by pointing out the unexamined (and intentional?) dualism of needs versus rights that Watras presents. Foremost among Boyles' other concerns is the "recurring *non sequitur*" of Watras' thesis. Namely, just because policy reformers think critically about their goals and clearly express their aims, it does not follow that they will be successful in their quests. Nor does it necessarily follow that profound and careful criticism will thwart said reforms. As for teachers, Boyles raises a pertinent and important question: "In the history of educational movements *qua* educational policy initiatives, have teachers ever been major players?"

Though Boyles disagrees with Watras on what follows from thinking clearly on the aims of education, he is in sympathy "with the idea that developing clear aims is noble and worthwhile." A good part of Boyles' response is therefore dedicated to a description of the methods he uses in one of his philosophy of education courses. His intent is to illustrate how he attempts to challenge his students to think philosophically about education, and also to engage his fellow philosophers of education in a discussion of how we all might better foster this goal.

ON THE ARTICLES

As Neil Postman argued over 30 years ago, the *question* is perhaps the most important tool that teachers have at their disposal.⁹ Of course, Postman's argument was not new. For millennia teachers have employed the Socratic method of dialogue that features an exchange of questions, answers, and questions.

Indeed, it has been said that philosophy is more about questioning answers than about answering questions. In “Questioning Authority in Education,” Charles Bingham offers a new, and I think, stimulating perspective on the perennial issue of the use of questions in pedagogy. Specifically, Bingham seeks to determine “the relation between the authority of the teacher and the use of pedagogical questions.” At the outset of his investigation, Bingham acknowledges that he was “fairly confident that a pedagogy that questions exercises less authority than a pedagogy that does not question.” His confidence was shaken, however, by a comment from a lawyer friend who recalled how the Socratic questioning in law school constituted a most authoritarian brand of pedagogy.

Bingham, through applying the work of Gadamer and Saussure, concludes that the use of questions (particularly those intended to elicit a predetermined “correct” response) can, and often does result in a dominating and authoritarian pedagogy. But that is not the end of the story. Bingham goes on to suggest ways in which the use of pedagogical questions might be less authoritarian. We have then, with Bingham’s fine essay, not only a new take on an old *question*, but also a narrative of Bingham’s change of thinking on the topic of authority and pedagogical questions.

With “The Contemporary Relevance of George Herbert Mead’s Social Psychology and Pedagogy,” Stephen Barnes contributes a solid and timely piece of work that nicely fits the conference theme. Barnes first explains several key tenets of Mead’s social and educational psychology. He then cites and describes three recent studies in educational psychology that illustrate and “bolster a Meadian understanding of social psychology and its consequent pedagogical upshots.” Finally, Mead’s findings are applied to a critique of the high stakes testing that is the centerpiece of President George W. Bush’s educational policy.¹⁰ With this approach, school funding is contingent upon students’ test scores. According to Mead’s psychology, the students are thus “motivated,” not by anything inherent in the curricular activities, but rather by the extrinsic goal of attaining high test scores. Moreover, the test-takers are further pressured by the threat of losing “friends, teachers, and other acquaintances.” Taking his cue from Mead, Barnes persuasively argues that this scenario creates a bifurcated and unfocused psyche in the student, resulting in little long term learning, and squashing any spontaneous desire the student might have for investigating the genuine and immediate problems and questions that would arise were she allowed to devote her attention to the subject matter at hand.

The Platonic figure of Socrates is the focus of articles by Tim Simpson and Justen Infinito. Simpson argues against the “orthodox” interpretation of Platonic philosophy, which holds that Plato is prescribing a pursuit of knowledge through the *possession* of the Forms. It is Simpson’s contention that Plato’s dialogues actually provide a “cautionary message to attend to the *limits* of

knowledge,” and suggest a “pedagogy of desire.” To make his case, Simpson cites several characteristics of the dialogues, including their routine ending in an inconclusive state of *aporia*, Socrates’ use of metaphor and other non-propositional attempts to access the Forms, and Plato’s finite conception of human nature that is erotically yearning yet never possessing the object of its desire. But is this “hopeless desire” justified? Simpson concludes that it is. Socrates recognizes his own ignorance, and in so doing gives rise to the desire to question, which is the essence of philosophy.

In “Education, Philosophy and The Art of Living,” Infinito utilizes the figure of Socrates as an exemplar of a meaningful and significant life. Infinito laments the fact that academic philosophy has to a great degree abandoned its traditional role of “helping individuals to determine (with wisdom) the best life for themselves.” With the rise of Christianity, philosophy largely ceded this role to religion. A foundational purpose of education, according to Infinito, should be to equip students with the tools to construct purposeful lives. In contemporary schooling, however, the primary purpose has often been reduced to an instrumental preparation for a vocation. Drawing from Nehamas and Hadot, Infinito argues that philosophy—as exemplified by the life of Socrates—is the ideal vehicle for students “to practice the art of living,” and for schools to achieve their foundational purpose.

While I am not proposing that *art* and *science* are necessarily in opposition (the two overlap and mesh in many ways), Infinito’s discussion of education and the art of living does provide an interesting juxtaposition with Greg Seals’ “Rebutting Two Claims that Education Cannot Be a Science.” In his rather ambitious attempt to lay the logical groundwork for establishing a science of education, Seals tackles two interrelated problems: the “problem of the lawlike statement” (a general statement of the sort able to support scientific research), and “the problem of the unfamiliar content” (the ability of a theory to supply research with an independent content). To resolve the first problem, Seals formulates a lawlike statement of the educative force of an experience—based on Dewey’s *Experience and Education*—that is logically analogous to Newton’s statement of the law of gravity.

Seals again relies on Dewey to resolve the problem of unfamiliar content. Dewey’s law, according to Seals, provides educators with the means to conduct scientific research on specified relationships in an educational context. It seems that Seals is aiming for more than simply formulating a theory of education that is worthy of the honorific moniker “scientific.” Specifically, it is his belief that this theoretical formulation will then inform research that can be useful in improving student learning. For the reader, then, the initial question is whether Seals’ formulation is successful logically and conceptually. But, perhaps the

more important question is whether this formulation will provide benefits for educational research and practice.

Barbara Thayer-Bacon also relies on Dewey, as well as on William James, and on a little help from Pierce in her efforts to “explore pragmatism’s association with relativism, not to rescue it from relativism but rather to highlight how aspects of the classic pragmatists’ positions support qualified relativism.” The elements that comprise Thayer-Bacon’s account of qualified relativism include: an emphasis on human fallibility; an understanding of knowledge claims as being contingent, contextual and relational; eschewing an either/or logic in favor of a both/and approach; and viewing the universe as pluralistic, open and unfinished. Thayer-Bacon also cites similarities between qualified relativism and the epistemology of several feminist thinkers. Though she doesn’t explicitly say so, I think I can safely infer that Thayer-Bacon believes qualified relativism can serve to inform and to promote an approach to education that is both democratic and just.

I found Megan Rust Mustain’s article to be an inspiring affirmation of the power of philosophy: both to clearly diagnose the problems of education and to offer ameliorative possibilities to improve education. Mustain begins by comparing the vacuous use of slogans—with which educational crises and reforms are typically addressed—with the rich potential of metaphors to perform this task. The metaphor she chooses to shed light on the “crisis” in education is the “double bind.” This is Gregory Bateson’s term for a dysfunctional pattern of familial communication wherein the victim is subjected to a “Catch 22-like” dilemma. As, Mustain points out, though; it is not only this contradictory dynamic that is problematic. “The ‘victim’ of the double bind is troubled not because he/she is confronted by a contradiction, but because he/she is precluded from articulating (communicating) his/her situation.”¹¹ “What we have here,” to cite the phrase from *Cool Hand Luke*, “is failure to communicate.”

To elaborate the pernicious effects of the double bind on the social individual, Mustain alludes to the work of Dewey, hooks, and Freire (among others) who have protested against the related social pathologies of alienation, *silencing* and *dehumanizing*. In response to these unhealthy dynamics that plague our schools, Mustain champions a “democratic pedagogy which seeks constantly to allow its students to challenge and reshape their world, [it] is thus a truly philosophical endeavor; it must cultivate the philosophically critical attitude toward self and society.”

Deron Boyles offers us another installment in his relentless, scathing and eloquent critique of the insidious influence of corporate commercialism on America’s schools. Boyles uses six questions—that were originally posed by Neil Postman as a means to evaluate the merits of technology—and amends them “in order to inquire about the epistemological implications of technology

use, as represented by Channel One.” He finds the use of Channel One to be wanting on every count. Most pointedly, Boyles takes the promoters of Channel One to task for their claim that the viewers of their “news” programming will benefit from an increased *knowledge* of current events. This reminded me of a song by John Fogerty in which he narrates a litany of events—from Eisenhower’s presidency to John Kennedy’s assassination to Apollo 11’s moon landing—and then sings the song’s chorus: “I know it’s true, oh so true, ‘cause I saw it on TV.” Fogerty’s song notwithstanding, I think Boyles presents a convincing case that—in addition to its deleterious effects on teachers and students—the utilization of Channel One fails to meet any measure of epistemic legitimacy that would warrant the appellation ‘educational’.

Putative claims to “knowledge” are also debunked in Darren Pascavage’s article. The target here is the claim of standardized test advocates that these tests measure knowledge. Pascavage coins the phrase “sophimetrics” to refer to the parallels between the practice of standardized testing and the practices of the Sophists. According to Pascavage, today’s “measurement sophistry” is characterized by the assumption that knowledge can be measured. *Knowledge* is then defined in terms of measurable skills, and tests are constructed to measure this “knowledge.” Furthermore, as with the Sophists, these “sophimetricians” have developed an arsenal of rhetorical devices to defend their practices, and the profit motive fuels the marketing of these tests.

Through a masterful application of Meno’s paradox of inquiry, Pascavage rightly concludes that teachers—through first-hand observations of the full body of a student’s work—are in the best position to determine what a student knows and has learned. Unfortunately, among administrators, policy makers, and in various accountability measures, the credibility of teachers’ professional judgment on these matters has been undermined—in large part—by the sophisticated assaults of the testing industry. As a result, we are faced with an increasing utilization of standardized testing: a practice that Pascavage argues should be roundly condemned as sophistic. Pascavage closes his splendid article with a challenge for philosophers of education to rise to the task of designing forms of student assessment that possess epistemic virtue.

In the journal’s last piece, Karen Drotar presents a fictional dialogue in the form of a series of letters between Charlotte (an American feminist circa 1916) and Ellanor (a recent émigré from Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s *Herland*). The two correspondents share their different perspectives on the political and social status of women, reproductive rights and sexuality, and the relation between men and women. Through the use of the dialogue, Drotar “examines how two women can maintain intimacy and respect in the midst of vast differences,” and challenges the reader to consider a “principled middle ground” that balances the views expressed by the interlocutors.

SOME MORE THOUGHTS ON CHANGE

My thinking has changed a great deal over the years. And I like thinking about the process of change: the trivial changes in our physical appearance, changes in our thinking that mark our individual intellectual journeys, or the events that generate societal transformations. I once held beliefs that I no longer hold. I am tempted to say I outgrew those beliefs, but that seems an unnecessary slight to those who maintain such beliefs. Maybe it is better to simply say that I changed my mind.

When I started my doctoral studies, many of my friends and family warned me about the corrupting influence of philosophy. In a sense they were right; philosophy has the power to change things. Rather than be alarmed at such changes or viewing them as a form of corruption, I like to view these changes as evidence of the transformative possibilities of philosophical reflection. In the movie *Dogma*, Chris Rock plays a character that claims to have been the 13th apostle. He says something to the effect that he prefers ideas to beliefs. His reasoning is that while one is obligated to maintain and defend beliefs, one is free to change one's mind about ideas.

Given the conference theme and the number of articles on Socrates, I thought a brief consideration of this excerpt from a recent George Will column might provide a fitting note to close on.

Try this thought experiment from a 1934 critic of American schooling: If you were ill and could be treated either by Hippocrates or by a young graduate of the Johns Hopkins medical school, with his modern technologies and techniques, you would choose the latter. But if you could choose to have your child taught either by Socrates or by a freshly minted holder of a degree in education full of the latest pedagogic theories and techniques? Socrates, please.¹²

Clearly, this is not so much a “thought experiment” as it is a rhetorical cheap shot at colleges of education in Will’s continuing efforts to discredit “educationists” and the “educational establishment.” I disagree with Will’s conclusion, but a thorough response will have to wait for another time. I would, though, like to call attention to his use of Socrates. It is a common tactic of conservatives to present an uncritical, antiseptic and romanticized portrayal of institutions and persons from the past: be it the family, the nation, the school, or in Will’s case, Socrates. No hint is given of Socrates’ thoroughly subversive character. Compare this tactic with the articles in this journal, which function not as some mythical monument to a “better time,” but rather as an active and engaging conversation with the voices of the past. A conversation that promises

to foster our understanding and that can serve to enrich the education of our students.

NOTES

1. The 2001 OVPES Conference theme was “Things Change? Classic Educational Ideas: Then, Now, and In The Future.”
 2. Robert Welker, who is currently a professor at Wittenberg University in Springfield, Ohio, taught the course.
 3. Bernard Mehl’s book *Classic Educational Ideas From Sumeria to America* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972) was the inspiration for the conference theme.
 4. The thesis title was *The Concept of Illumination in I Corinthians II and the Paraclete Passages*. It was, in fact, an exegetical study of the relevant biblical passages.
 5. Participants in the symposium, “Philosophers of Education Discuss: What Can We Do To Improve Our Schools?” included Deron Boyles, Clint Collins, Eugenie Potter, Barbara Thayer-Bacon, Barb Stengel, and William Fridley.
 6. Mark McKenzie is currently an assistant professor at Troy State University in Alabama, and Ron Ferguson is the Co-Director of the Professional Development and Research Institute on Blindness in Louisiana.
 7. Israel Scheffler, *The Language of Education* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1960), 36-46.
 8. See, for example, Pratte’s analysis of *needs* and *rights* in educational discourse, which also includes references to the relevant literature. Richard Pratte, *Philosophy of Education: Two Traditions* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1992).
 9. Neil Postman and Charles Weingartner, *Teaching As A Subversive Activity* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969), 59-81.
 10. For an excellent “popular” critique of these matters that I use in my classes, see: Alfie Kohn, *The Case Against Standardized Testing: Raising the Scores, Ruining the Schools* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2000).
 11. This same dynamic is also described in the work of Alice Miller. Miller contends that traditional child rearing practices—in schools, ecclesiastical settings, and the family—consist of physical and emotional cruelty that she labels “poisonous pedagogy.” According to Miller, children that are subjected to such treatment have no recourse other than to repress their anger, rage and resentment for their abusive parents. The reason they have no recourse is in great part due to the effects of moral, religious, and ideological principles that convince the child such treatment is “for your own good.” See, Alice Miller, *For Your Own Good: Hidden cruelty in child-rearing and the roots of violence*, third edition (New York: Noonday Press, 1990).
 12. George F. Will, “Accountability still key to education,” *The Columbus Dispatch*, 1 February 2001, sec. Forum.
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